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Sunday, May 23, 2010

North Korea Nuclear and Missile Issues

Sunday, May 23, 2010 - 0 Comments

With the Six-Party Talks just concluding in Beijing, it certainly is a good time to discuss North Korea. We are fortunate indeed that, as always, the Institute for Corean-American Studies is focusing Washington’s attention on a grave matter that concerns both Americans and America’s friends in South Korea and Japan.

When reviewing the new agreement that came out of the Six-Party Talks, it is important to keep in mind that the most important issue on the table is not how much oil we give to North Korea. The most important issue is-just what ICAS have identified—how to get Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them.

That is what the Six-Party Talks have been all about. The world began scrambling last night to figure out if all participants, especially Kim Jong-II, would accept the new agreement, and indeed whether it will be effective.

From what I have heard so far, I am disappointed. It looks like too much was given away or punted down the road. We appear to be providing significant rewards for minimal compliance and leaving the important issues to future negotiations and to working groups that may or may not be able to resolve them. This makes any follow-on negotiations key, if the United States is insisted on getting more assurances and concessions on certain points.

Unfortunately, all of this is painfully familiar. We’ve been here before, literally.

Just six and a half years ago, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stood here and delivered a major address on the outcome of her visit to Pyongyang. She talked about the progress the Clinton Administration had made in dealing with North Korea. She chronicled how the North had violated its obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency; how it had been actively developing nuclear weapons, and how Washington had engaged in “vigorous diplomacy” to get to the Agreed Farmework of 1994—which, as you know, was when the North agreed to freeze production of plutonium at Yongbyon and Taechon in exchange for energy and other concessions.

Time proved that our best hopes and the best efforts of our best negotiators then were wrong. Or perhaps I should say half-wrong. Without the Agreed Framework, we might well be dealing with a North Korea holding dozens of nuclear bombs.

Yet the Agreed Framework did not solve the bigger problem. It simply constrained it. It kicked the big can of denuclearization down the road, deferring its resolution.

And so it remains the central issue we face today.

Time will tell if this new agreement contains the keys to locking up the North’s nuclear programs. A lot is being assumed. North Korea to this point has not been willing to give up its uranium-based nuclear weapons program, and based on recent statements and actions, it is still doubtful that Pyongyang would give up its plutonium program.

Biological and Chemical Weapons of North Korea

North Korea acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987, and the Geneva Protocol on January 4, 1989, but has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention. The country is believed to possess a substantial arsenal of chemical weapons. It reportedly acquired the technology necessary to produce tabun and mustard gas as early as the 1950s, and now possesses a full arsenal of nerve agents and other advanced varieties, with the means to launch them in artillery shells North Korea has expended considerable resources on equipping its army with chemical-protection equipment. South Korea, however, has not felt the need to take such measures.

North Korea using its Nuclear Program as Political Tools

Nuclear deterrence

Some scholars and analysts have argued that North Korea is using nuclear weapons primarily as a political tool, particularly to bring the U. S. to the table to begin re-establishing normal relations and end the long-standing economic embargo against North Korea. A key point of this agreement is the observation that the threat of nuclear weapons is the only thing that has brought the U. S. into serious negotiations. In a lecture in 1993, Bruce Cummings asserted that, based on information gathered by the CIA, the activity around the Yongbyon facility may have been done expressly to draw the attention of U. S. satellites. The also pointed out that the CIA had not claimed North Korea had nuclear weapons, but that they had enough material to create such weapons should they choose to do so. North Korea’s energy supply has been deteriorating since the 1990s. Although North Korea’s indigenous nuclear power capacity is insignificant, the two light-water moderated plants, if built, would be an important source of electricity in a nation with scarce resources. Although couched in a derisive statement, Donald Rumsfeld demonstrated the severe lack of electricity for the entire nation in a photograph released in October 2006. Another factor in this argument is that many parties have a vested interest in the claim that North Korea has nuclear weapons. For North Korea, it has been a bargaining tool for opening diplomatic discussions and receiving aid. The Grand National Party, currently the opposition party in South Korea, has made their disagreement with the Sunshine police a major political wedge. Leading politicians in Japan have openly expressed a desire to remove Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, and the threat of a nuclear-armed North Korea feeds into the perceived need for a larger standing army and defense force. The Bush administration in the United States has also made the threat of terrorism the central focus of foreign policy since the September 11, 2001 attacks. The U. S. maintains a force of nearly 40,000 troops in South Korea, the second largest in East Asia that would likely have to be curtailed if the political situation changed significantly in Korea, something expected to negatively affect the U. S. sphere of influence in the region.

On March 17, 2007, North Korea told delegates at international nuclear talks that it is preparing to shut down its main nuclear facility. The agreement was reached following a series of six-party talks, involving North Korea, South Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and the U. S, begun in 2003. According to the agreement, a list of its nuclear programs will be submitted and the nuclear facility will be disabled in exchange for fuel aid and normalization talks with the U. S. and Japan. This had been delayed from April due to a dispute with the United States over Banco Delta Asia, but on July 14, IAEA inspectors confirm the shutdown of North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear reactor.

Monday, May 17, 2010

London Road (Summary)

Monday, May 17, 2010 - 3 Comments

It was a bright Sunday morning in early June, 1934. I was 19 years old, the right time to be leaving home. I carried a small rolled-up tent, a violin in a blanket, a change of clothes, a tin of treacle biscuits, and some cheese. My 3 sisters and one brother had already gone before me and two brothers had yet to make up their minds.
The last I saw of my country home as a I left it to discover the world, was the stooping figure of my mother. She stood bent at the top of the bank, silently watching me go, not questioning why I went, juts one gnarled red hand raised in farewell and blessing. Then I turned the corner, and closed that part of my life forever.
I was persuaded to leave by the traditional forces that had sent many generations. The thought never came into my mind that others had done this before me. And now I was on my journey.
Naturally, I was going to London, a hundred miles to east. But, as I had never yet seen the sea, I thought to walk by the coast and find it. This would add another 100 miles, but I had all the time to spend.
My excitement was steadily declined as I felt really alone at last. A growing reluctance weighed me down. I found my self longing for something that could stop me> But, none came. I was free. The day's silence said it all, "Go, where you want. You asked for it. It's all yours. You are on your own now, and no one is going to stop you." I was hurt by echoes of home.

Relations of U.S.A. and North Korea

North KoreaUnited States relations

Even though U. S. President George W. Bush had named North Korea as a part of an “Axis of Evil” following the September 11, 2001 attacks, U. S. officials stated that the United States was not planning any immediate military action. According to John Feffer, co-director of the think tank Foreign Policy in Focus, the primary problem is that the current U. S. administration fundamentally doesn’t want an agreement with North Korea. The Bush administration considers the 1994 Agreed Framework to have been a flawed agreement. It doesn’t want be saddled with a similar agreement, for if it did sign one, it would then be open to charges of “appeasing” Pyongyang. The vice President has summed up the approach as: “We don’t negotiate with evil, we defeat evil.” American ire at North Korea is further inflamed by allegations of state-sponsored drug smuggling, money laundering, and wide scale counterfeiting. Diplomatic efforts at resolving the North Korean situation are complicated by the different goals and interests of the nations of the region. While none of the parties desire a North Korea with nuclear weapons, Japan and South Korea are especially concerned about North Korean counter-strikes following possible military action against North Korea. The People’s Republic of China and South Korea are also very worried about the economic and social consequences should this situation cause the North Korean government to collapse. In early 2000 the Zurich-based company ABB was awarded the contract to provide the design and key components for two light-water nuclear reactors to North Korea.

Nuclear History of North Korea


North Korea maintains uranium mines with an estimated four million tons of exploitable high-quality uranium ore. Information on the state and quality of their mines is lacking, but it is estimated that the ore contains approximately 0.8% extractable uranium. In the mid-1960s, it established a large-scale atomic energy research complex in Yongbyon and trained specialists from students who had studied in the Soviet Union. Under the cooperation agreement concluded between the USSR and the DPRK, a nuclear research center was constructed near the small town of Yongbyon. In 1965 a Soviet IRT-2M research reactor was assembled for this center. From 1965 through 1973 fuel (fuel elements) enriched to 10 percent was supplied to the DPRK for this reactor.

In the 1970s it focused study on the nuclear fuel cycle including refining, conversion and fabrication. In 1974 Korean specialists independently modernized Soviet IRT-2M research reactor in the same way that other reactors operating in the USSR and other countries had been modernized, bringing its capacity up to 8 megawatts and switching to fuel enriched to 80 percent. Subsequently, the degree of fuel enrichment was reduced. In the same period the DPRK began to build a 5 MWe research reactor, what is called the “second reactor.” In the 1977 the DPRK concluded an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), allowing the latter to inspect a research reactor which was built with the assistance of the USSR. The North Korean nuclear weapons program dates back to the 1980s. In the 1980s, focusing on practical uses of nuclear energy and the completion of a nuclear weapon development system, North Korea began to operate facilities for uranium fabrication and conversion. It began construction of a 200 MWe nuclear reactor and nuclear reprocessing facilities in Taechon and Youngbyon, respectively, and conducted high-explosive detonation tests. In 1985 US officials announced for the first time that they had intelligence data proving that a secret nuclear reactor was being built 90 km north of Pyongyang near the small town of Yongbyon. The installation at Yongbyon had been known for eight years from official IAEA reports. In 1985, under intenational pressure, Pyongyang acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). However the DPRK refused to sign a safeguards agreement with the International Weapons (NPT). However, the DPRK refused to sign a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an obligation it had as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Sunday, May 9, 2010

North Korea US stand on the Nuclear Issue

Sunday, May 9, 2010 - 0 Comments

Nuclear-Weapons Program of North Korea

North Korea conduced an underground nuclear explosive test on October 16, 2006. The estimated yield of the test was less than one kiloton.

In a _____ discussion with the United States and China in Beijing on April 24, 2003, North Korean officials admitted for the first time that they possessed nuclear weapons. Furthermore, North Korean official claim to have reprocessed spent fuel rods and have threatened to begin exporting nuclear materials unless the United States agrees to one-on-one talks with North Korea. Tensions between the United States and North Korea have been running especially high since, in early October of 2002, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly informed North Korean officials that the United States was aware that North Korea denied this, but later confirmed the variety of the US claim. In confirming that they had an active nuclear weapons program, they also declared the Agreed Framework nullified.

The Agreed Framework signed by the United States and North Korea on October 21, 1994 in Geneva agreed that:

  • North Korea would freeze its existing nuclear program and agree to enhanced International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.
  • Both sides would cooperate to replace the DPRK’s graphic moderated reactors for related facilites with light-water (LWR) power plants.
  • Both countries would move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.
  • Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.
  • And that both sides would work to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Prior to the establishment of the Agreed Framwork, intelligence sources believed that North Korea could have extracted plutonium from their reactors for use in nuclear weapons; perhaps enough for one or two nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it has remained unclear whether North Korea had actually produced nuclear weapons due to difficulties in developing detonation devices.

Gulf War 1991

The 1991Gulf War

On August 2, 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait and was widely condemned internationally. The policy of the United States on Hussein’s government changed rapidly, as it was feared Saddam intended to attack other oil-rich nations in the region such as Saudi Arabia as stories of atrocities from the occupation of Kuwait spread, several of which later proved false, older atrocities and his WMD arsenal were also given attention Iraq’s nuclear weapons program suffered a serious setback in 1981 when the reactor used to generate source material for its bomb was bombed by Israel. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists concurs with this view: there were far too many technological challenges unsolved, they say an international coalition of nations, led by the United States, liberated Kuwait in 1991. In the terms of UN ceasefire set out in Security Council Resolution 686, and in Resolution 687, Iraq was forbidden from developing, possessing or using chemical, biological and nuclear weapons by resolution 686. Also prescribed by the treaty were missiles with a range of more than 150 kilometres. The UN Special Commission on weapons (UNSCOM) was created to carry out weapons inspections in Iraq, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was to verify the destruction of Iraq’s nuclear program.

Q.32: A Inspection team of UNO list the Iraq for destruction of mass destructive weapon, in the light of Inspector’s views USA attacks on Iraq what do you think, about this attack.

Ans: UNSCOM Inspections 1991-1998

The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) was set up after the 1990 invasion of Kuwait to inspect Iraqi weapons facilities. It was headed first by Rolf Ekeus and later by Richard Bulter. During several visits to Iraq by UNSCOM, weapons inspectors interviewed British-educated Iraqi biologists Rihab Rashid Taha. According to a 1999 report from the US Defense Intelligence Agency, the normally mild-mannered Taha exploded into violent rages whenever UNSCOM questioned her about al-Hakam, shouting, screaming and, on one occasion, smashing a chair, while insisting that al-Hakam was a chicken-feed plant. “There were a few things that were peculiar about this animal-feed production plant”, Charles Duelfer, UNSCOM’s deputy executive chairman, later told reporters, “beginning with the extensive air defenses surrounding it.” The facility was destroyed by UNSCOM in 1996. In 1995, UNSCOM’s principal weapons inspector, Dr. Rod Barton from Australia, showed Taha documents obtained by UNSCOm that showed the Iraqi government had just purchased 10 tons of growt mediu from a British company called Oxoid. Growth media is a mxture of sugars, proteins and minerals that provides nutrients for microorganisms to grow. It can be used in hospitals and microbiology/molecular biology research laboratories. In hospitals, swabs from patients are placed in dishes containing growth medium for diagnostic purposes. Iraq’s hospital consumption of growth medium was just 200 kg a year; yet in 1988, Iraq imported 39 tons of it. Shown this evidence by UNSCOM, Taha admitted to the inspectors that she had grown 19,000 litres of botulism toxin; 8,000 litres of anthrax, 2,000 litres of aflaxins, which can cause liver failure; Clostridium perfringenes a bacteria that can cause gas gangrene, and ricin, a castor-bean derivative which can kill by impeding ____. She also admitted conducting research into cholear, salmonella, foot and mouthj disease, and caned pox, a disease that uses the same growth techniques as smallpox, but which is safer for researchers to work with. It was because of the discovery of Taha’s work with camel pox that the US and British intelligence services feared Saddam Hussein may have been planning to weaponize the smallpox virus. Iraq had a smallpox outbreak in 1971 and the Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) believed the Iraqi government retained contaminated material.

UNSCOM also learned that, in August 1990, after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, Taha’s team was ordered to set up a program to weaponize the biological agents. By January 1991, a team of 100 scientists and support staff had filled 157 bombs and 16 missile warheads with botulin toxin, and 50 bombs and five missile warheads with anthrax. In an interview with the BBC, Taha denied the Iraqi government had weaponized bacteria. “We never intended to use it”, she told journalist Jane Corbin of the BBC’s Panorama program. “We never wanted to cause harm or damage to anybody”. However, UNSCOM found the munitions dumped in a river near al-Hakam. UNSCOM also discovered that Taha’s team had conducted inhalation experiments on donkeys from England and on beagles from Germany. The inspectors seized photographs showing beagles having convulsions inside sealed containers.

Character of United Nation for the weapon of Mass Destruction

Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs

The Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch provides substantive support for the activities of the United Nations in the area of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological weapons), including the threat of use of weapons of mass destruction in terrorist acts, as well as missiles. The Branch follows closely all developments and trends with regard to weapons of mass destruction in all their aspects in order to keep the Secretary-General fully informed and to provide information to Member States and the international community. The Branch supports, and participants in, multilateral efforts to strengthen the international norm on diparmament and non-prolifcation of weapons of mass destruction and, in this connection, it coopertes with relevant intergovernment organizations and specialized agenices of the United Nations system, in particular the Internatioanl Atonic energy Agency (IAEA), the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO PrepCom).

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is a deadmark multilateral treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving much disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Treaty represents the only binding commitment by the nuclear-weapon States at the multilateral level to the goal of nuclear disarmament. Opened for signature on July 1968, the Treaty entered into force on 5 March 1970. A total of 190 States have joined the Treaty including the five nuclear-weapon States. More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the Treaty’s significance.

Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans all nuclear explosions, for military or civil purposes. After three years of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the CTBT was adopted on 10 September 1996 by the United Nations General Assembly and opened for signature on 24 September 1996. The CTBT will enter into force 180 days after it has been ratified by the 44 States that are identified in Annex II to the Treaty and that possess nuclear power or research creators. Iraq and weapons of mass destruction concerns the Iraqi government’s use, possession, and alleged intention of acquiring more types of weapons of mass destruction (WMB) during the presidency of Saddam Hussein. During his reign of several decades, he was internationally known for his use of chemical weapons in the 1980s against civilians and in the Iran-Iraq War. Following the 1991 Gulf War he also engaged in a decade-long confrontation with the United Nations and its weapons inspectors, which ended in the 2003 invasion by the United States. The United Nations located and destroyed large quantities of Iraqi WMB throughout the 1990s in spite of persistent Iraqi obstruction. Washington withdrew weapons inspectors in 1998, resulting in Operation Desert Fox, which further degraded Iraq’s WMD capability. The United States and the UK, along with many intelligence experts, asserted that Saddam Hussein still possessed large hidden stockpiles of WMD in 2003, and that he must be prevented from building any more. Inspections restarted in 2002, but hadn’t turned up any evidence of ongoing programs when the United States and the “Coalition of the Willing” invaded Iraq and overthrew Saddam Hussein in March 2003.

Great controversy emerged when no such weapons were found, leading to accusations that the United States, and in particular its President George W. Bush had deliberately inflated intelligence or lied about Iraq’s weapons in order to justify an invasion of the country. While various leftover weapons components from the 1980s and 1990s have also been found, most weapons inspectors do not now believe that the WMD program proceeded after 2002, though various theories continue to be put forward.

Monday, May 3, 2010

Cold War and its Conflict in Detail

Monday, May 3, 2010 - 0 Comments

The Cold War was the period of conflict, tension and competition between the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies from the mid-1940s to the early 1990s. Throughout the period, the rivalry between the two superpowers was played out in multiple arenas and had a number of distinguishing characteristics. The Cold War dominated international relations between major global powers such as the US, Britain, France, the USSR and China. It was characterised by a number of flash-points around the globe which threatened to turn the Cold War hot. A few examples of these potentially explosive situations are the crises in Germany in general and Berlin in particular, the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), and the wars in Korea (1950 – 1953), Vietnam War (1964 – 1975), and Afghanistan (1979 – 1989). There were also, however, periods when tension was reduced as both sides sought d├ętente. Although many “hot” wars were fought over the period in question, the superpowers never fought one another directly. They did, however, support opposite sides in various conflicts, thus opposing each other indirectly. The main deterrent to a direct military confrontation (and, consequently, a Third World War) was the severe threat posed by the respective nuclear arsenals of the two sides. They were very large and offered the very real possibility of mutual assured destruction. It was an ideological struggle between Western, democratic, capitalist states and the Eastern bloc of communist, autocratic nations. Both sides attempted to win other countries (particularly in Asiaand Africa) over in support of their respective ideologies. Being a multi-faceted conflict, the Cold War also comprised propaganda, psychology, rival military coalitions, espionage; military, industrial and technological developments (including the space race); costly defense spending; a massive conventional and nuclear arms race; financial, military and food aid to Third-World nations; confrontations within the UNO; and numerous proxy wars.

There never was a direct military engagement between the US and the Soviet Union, but there was a half-century of military build-up, and political battles for support around the world, including significant involvement of allied and satellite nations. Although the US and the Soviet Union had been allied against

Cold War and Cuban Missile Crisis

Cold War: Cuban Missile Crisis

According to Nikita Khrushchev’s memoirs, in May 1962 he conceived the idea of placing intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Cuba as a means of countering an emerging lead of the United States in developing and deploying strategic missiles. He also presented the scheme as a means of protecting Cuba from another United States-sponsored invasion, such as the failed attempt at the Bay of Pigs in 1961.

After obtaining Castro’s approval, the Soviet Union worked and quickly and secretly to build missile installations in Cuba. On October 16, President Jon Kennedy was shown reconnaissance photographs of Soviet missile installations under construction in Cuba. After seven days of guarded and intense debate in the United States administration, during which Soviet diplomats denied that installations for offensive missiles were being built in Cuba, President Kennedy, in a televised address on October 22, announced the discovery of the installations and proclaimed that any nuclear missile attack from Cuba would be regarded as an attack by the Soviet Union and would be responded to accordingly. He also imposed a naval quarantine on Cuba to prevent further Soviet shipments of offensive military weapons from arriving there.

During the crisis, the two sides exchanged many letters and other communications, both formal and “back channel.” Khrushchev sent letters to Kennedy on October 23 and 24 indicating the deterrent nature of the missiles in Cuba and the peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union. On October 26, Khrushchev sent Kennedy a long rambling letter seemingly proposing that the missile installations would be dismantled and personnel removed in exchange for United States assurances that it or its proxies would not invade Cuba. On October 27, another letter to Kennedy arrived from Khrushchev, suggesting that missile installations in Cuba would be dismantled if the United States dismantled its missile installations in Turkey. The American administration decided to ignore this second letter and to accept the offer outlined in the letter of October 26. Khrushchev then accepted on October 28 that he would dismantle the installations and return them to the Soviet Union, expressing his trust that the United States would not invade Cuba. Further negotiations were held to implement the October 28 agreement, including a United States demand that Soviet light bombers also be removed from Cuba, and to specify the exact form and conditions of United States assurances not to invade Cuba.

Cold War During the Second World War and its Impacts after World War II

Cold War:

The Western democracies and the Soviet Union discussed the progress of World War II and the nature of the post war settlement at conferences in Tehran (1943), yalta (February 1945), and Potsdam (July-August 1945). After the war, disputes between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies, particularly over the Soviet takeover of East European states, led Winston Churchill to warn in 1946 that an “iron curtain” was descending through the middle of Europe. For this part, Joseph Stalin deepened the estrangement between the United States and the Soviet Union when he assorted in 1946 what World War II was an unavoidable and inevitable consequence of “capitalist imperialism” and implied that such a war might reoccur. The Cold War was a period of East-West competition, tension, and conflict short of full-scale war, characterized by mutual perceptions of hostile intention between military-political alliances or blocs. There were real wars, sometimes called “proxy wars” because they were fought by Soviet allies rather than the USSR itself – along with competition for influence in the Third World War, and a major superpower arms race. After Stanlin’s death, East-West relations went through phases of alternating relaxation and confrontation, including a comparative phase during the 1960s and another, teamed dtente, during the 1970s. A final phase during the late 1980s and early 1990s was hailed by President Mikhail Gorbachev, and especially by the president of the new post-Communist Russian republic, Boris Yeltsin, as well as by President George Bush, as beginning a partnership between the two states that could address many global problems: Soviet Perspectives.

Cold War

After World War II, Joseph Stalin saw the world as divided into two camps: regimes on the one hand, and the Communist and progressive world on the other. In 1947, President Harry ___ also spoke of two diametrically opposed systems. One free, and the other bent on subjugating other nations. After Stalin’s death, Nikita Khrushchev stated in 1956 that imperialism and capitalism could ___ without war because the Communist system had become stronger. The Geneva Summit of 1955 among Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States, and the Camp David Summit of 1959 between Eisenhower and Khrushchev raised hopes of a more cooperative spirit between East and West. In 1963 the United States and the Soviet Union signed some confidence-building agreements, and in 1967 president Lyndon Johnson met with Soviet Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin in Glassboro, New Jersey. Interspersed with such moves toward cooperation, however, were hostile acts that threatened broader conflict, ____ the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 and the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia of 1968. The long rule of Leonid Brezhnev (1964-1982) is now referred to in Russia as the “period of stagnation.” But the Soviet stance toward the United States became less overtly hostile in the early 1970s. Negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union resulted in summit meetings and the signing of strategic arms limitation agreements. Brezhev proclaimed in 1973 that peaceful coexistence was the normal, permanent, and irreversible state of relations between imperialist and Communist countries, although he warned that conflict might continue in the Third World. In the late 1970s, ____ internal repression and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led to a renewal of Cold War hostility. Soviet views of the United States changed once again after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in early 1985. Arms control negotiations were renewed, and President Regan undertook a new series of summit meetings with Gorbachev that led to arms reductions and facilitated a growing sympathy even among Communist leaders for more cooperation and the rejection of class-based, conflict-oriented view of the world.

With President Yeltsin’s recognition of independence for the other republics of the former USSR and his launching of a full-scale economic reform program designed to create a market economy, Russia was pledged at last to overcoming both the imperial and the ideological legacies of the Soviet Union.

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